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Abstract. Unlike the methodological sciences such as mathematics and decision 
theory, which use the hypothetical-deductive method and may be fully expressed in 
complex  mathematical  models  because  their  only  truth  criterion  is  logical 
consistency,  the  substantive  sciences  have  as  their  truth  criterion  the 
correspondence to reality, adopt an empirical-deductive method, and are supposed 
to  generalize  from  and  often  unreliable  regularities  and  tendencies.  Given  this 
assumption,  it  is  very  difficult  for  economists  to  predict  economic  behavior, 
particularly major financial crises.  
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Economics or political economy is a major social science, because it has as its 
object something that is central to human life: the economic system, how people 
organize labor and production, and how they allocate income – in other words, 
because men and women dedicate a large part of their existence to work and 
make a living in market-coordinated economic systems that economics seeks to 
understand and explain. Yet economics should be a modest science, because, as 
with all other social sciences, its best models – the models that really make sense 
– are simple and open; or because its predictive power is limited in so far as 
(thank God)  men  and women continue  to be free individuals making choices 
under uncertainty and according to criteria that are not constant. Consequently, 
economists or policymakers should also be modest and reasonable; they must 
acknowledge  that  they  have  a  limited  capacity  to  predict  the  future.  The 
members of the Association for Evolutionary Economics know that well. They 
are  structuralist  and  institutionalist  economists  who  reject “pure” economics, 
and see economics as a social or historical science: a science where theory is supposed to predict the economic behavior of free individuals – of agents who 
are  miles  away  from  the  atoms  and  the  cells  of  the  natural  sciences.    With 
heartfelt thanks to the AFEE for the James Street Scholar for 2012 that it has 
awarded me, I thought this was the right moment to say how I view our science.  
Today we are still in the midst of the long crisis that began with the 2008 crash. 
In  this  historical  circumstance,  economists  should  be  particularly  modest, 
because the central cause of the crisis was the arrogance of the economic models 
that justified “scientifically” the deregulation of financial markets. What does it 
mean for a social science to be arrogant? Essentially, it means supposing that a 
social  science  can  be  as  precise  as  the  methodological  sciences,  particularly 
mathematics, or, at least, as precise as the natural sciences. It means developing 
closed models  that supposedly encompass all the  relevant  variables,  ignoring 
that this is impossible for the sciences that deal with human beings, who are 
endowed  with  freedom  and,  for  that  reason,  are  inherently  unpredictable.  If 
natural  scientists  who deal with highly predictable  physical  particles  or with 
reasonably predictable life cells and genes are modest, because they know how 
complex the object of their research is, economists should be much more modest. 
The arrogance of neoclassical economics 
When we develop economic theories we must limit the level of abstraction of our 
claims.  For  sure,  the  more  abstract  and  general  the  theory  the  better  it  is, 
because  it  will  be  simple  and  encompassing;  but,  as  a  trade-off,  it  may  lose 
contact  with  economic  reality  –  with  a  reality  that  is  historical.  As  Geoffrey 
Hodgson (2001: 4) remarks, “the desire for a general theory obliges scientists to 
simplify and to overturn the very generality for which they strive. The lure of a 
general  theory  is  in  part  responsible  for  a  degree  of  neglect  of  history  in 
contemporary economics and sociology”. This is particularly true of mainstream 
economics. Neoclassical economics – essentially, the general equilibrium model, 
rational  expectations’  macroeconomics,  neoclassical  growth  models,  and  the 
theory  of  efficient  financial  markets  –  is  highly  abstract  and  general,  but  the 
trade-off  was  not  just  between  generality  and  an  incapacity  to  deal  with  a 
complex and changing historical reality. This kind of cost can always be managed by  eliminating  simplifying  assumptions.  The  real  trade-off  was  between 
generality  and  science.  The  outcome  was  not  scientific  models,  because 
neoclassical economists adopted an inappropriate scientific method. Instead of 
doing what natural and social scientists are supposed to do – namely, to look for 
regularities  and  tendencies  in  the  substantive  object  of  study  (in  the  case  of 
economics,  economic  systems)  and  to  generalize  from  them  –  neoclassical 
economists  sat in their armchairs and  deduced the  whole  neoclassical model 
from homo economicus and the law of diminishing returns. This methodological 
choice  –  the  decision  to  use  in  the  development  of  a  substantive  science,  as 
economics is, a method that is not suited to it but to the methodological sciences 
(sciences  that  have  no  object,  but  are  an  aid  to  thinking)  –  leads  to  the 
construction of an essentially mistaken body of knowledge – of an ideological 
system without predictive power but with poisonous consequences: allowing for 
the  adoption  of  policies  and  non-policies  that  just  increase  inequality  and 
exacerbate the financial instability of economic systems. 
To the extent that the hypothetical-deductive method allowed for the building of 
a “precise” or “mathematical” science, its practitioners became arrogant, owners 
of  a  “pure”  and  fully  rational  science  based  on  the  mathematical  concept  of 
optimization or of Pareto optimality. The more they believe that human beings 
or  economic  agents  are  rational,  the  more  arrogant  their  economics  will  be, 
because the stronger will be their claim to precision; because the more certain 
will they be of the truthfulness of their claims – a truthfulness whose criterion is 
not correspondence to reality (the correct criterion for the substantive sciences), 
but logical consistency (the correct criterion for the methodological or adjective 
sciences). 
The classical definition of man – “man is the rational animal” – remains valid. 
Man  is  the  only  animal  capable  of  being  rational.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
economic system that economics seeks to understand and interpret is capitalism, 
a social organization in which, for the first time in history, production obeys the 
rationality principle – with profit as the objective and with capital accumulation embodying technological progress as the most adequate means to achieve that 
objective.1 
Thus, men are capable of being rational, but are they rational? What does it mean 
to be  rational, and to what degree are men rational? The definition of what it 
means to be rational in economic terms is far from agreed. Some say that an 
agent is rational when he or she maximizes his or her economic interests; others, 
that an individual is rational when he or she chooses reasonably adequate means 
to achieve distinct goals among which are economic interests. The degree of the 
rationality of economic agents  is also open to debate:  whether  they are fully 
rational,  as  neoclassical  economics  supposes,  or  whether,  besides  making 
compromises  among  economic  and  other  objectives,  they  do  not  necessarily 
choose the most appropriate means to achieve them. 
If  men  were  fully  rational,  a  hypothetical-deductive  method  would  be 
appropriate, because the theories based on such an assumption would precisely 
predict economic actions. But if they are not so rational, as recent research by 
behaviorist  psycho-economists  has  definitively  demonstrated,  this  method 
becomes  meaningless;  worse  than  that,  it  becomes  a  source  of  erroneous 
assessments of how economic systems work.  
Economics wants to be the “queen” of the social sciences if not a natural science, 
because it largely uses mathematics to express its models. Absurdly, for many of 
its practitioners models are scientific only when they are formalized, when they 
are  expressed  in  mathematical  terms.    In  so  far  as  they  use  a  hypothetical-
deductive method – that is, they use axioms to deduce the theory – the theory is 
mathematics-friendly. But it is not science-friendly, because the deductions that 
it derives from the assumption of full rationality are intrinsically and necessarily 
wrong. Friedman (1953) is wrong when he says that we may treat the behavioral 
axioms  “as  if”  they  were  true  because  the  predictions  derived  from  this 
“scientific” method would be correct. On the contrary, predictions are most of 
                                                        
1 On this matter see the classical analysis of Celso Furtado in Chapter 3 of Furtado 
(1961). time wrong; they lead to major policy errors, and cause major harm. They may 
be true, but only by accident. 
The challenge that economics faces is not to conserve the hypothetical-deductive 
method and to be nevertheless realistic. Also, it is not to conserve the method 
and to claim that economics is an “inexact science”. This last approach is the one 
adopted by Daniel Hausman (1992: 2). He says that “the method of economics is 
deductive, and confidence in the implications of economics axioms depends on 
the confidence in its axioms rather than from testing their implications”.  In this 
passage I would just substitute “neoclassical economics” for “economics”. But he 
adds: “in my view many of the basic principles of economics are inexact laws…” 
And,  instead  of  facing  the  full  consequences  of  his  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
axioms of  neoclassical economics, he retreats: “…  and the  methods of theory 
appraisal  that  economists  employ  are  scientifically  acceptable”.  This  is 
inconsistent. If neoclassical economists depend more on axioms than on testing, 
and  if  they  produce  an  inexact  science,  how  can  I  say  that  their  method  is 
acceptable?  
Probability 
Keynes did not fall into this error because, although originally in the neoclassical 
tradition,  he  eventually  adopted  a  historical-deductive  or  empirical-deductive 
method.2 He  did not share the Platonist belief that an intrinsic or immanent 
rationality exists that philosophers and scientists are supposed to discover. The 
only  great  economist  who  consistently  adopted  the  hypothetic -deductive 
method  was  Alfred  Marshall,  but   in  reality   he  was  foundi ng  a  new 
methodological  science  –  economic  decision-making  theory  –  in  which  the 
hypothetical-deductive method is legitimate. When he was doing economics, his 
analysis was always distinctly historical. 
                                                        
2 I originally contrasted the historical-deductive method and the hypothetical-deductive 
method in Bresser-Pereira (2009). Rather than a Platonist, Keynes was an Aristotelian in so far as he believed in the 
existence of an outward and contradictory reality, and his criterion for assessing 
reality  was  not  pure  reason  but  reasonableness.  This  approach  is  clearly 
apparent in his concept of uncertainty as defined in the General Theory of 1936. 
When, 16 years before, he wrote his A Treatise on Probability (1921), he was still 
thinking primarily in deductive terms; as Donald Gillies (2006: 200) remarks, 
“Keynes’ basic idea was that probability constitutes a generalization of deductive 
logic”. But he wanted also to convey that scientific propositions and arguments 
are always probabilistic: that you never can definitively reach the truth, but you 
can pragmatically define as true the best knowledge that you have so far been 
able to attain. For Keynes (1921: 4), it was impossible to define probabilities 
mathematically, but men are able to define it intuitively, using their judgment. He 
argued that in so far as we use our knowledge to define how probable a future 
event is, “probability may be called subjective. It is not, that is to say, subject to 
human caprice. When once the facts are given which determine our knowledge, 
what  is  probable  or  improbable  in  these  circumstances  has  been  fixed 
objectively, and in independence of our opinion.” Thus, for Keynes, probability is 
a rational belief based on available knowledge; in this sense, it is an opinion, but 
“this opinion is, for the nature of the case, incapable of positive proof”.  
According Athol Fitzgibbons (1988: 14), Keynes’s approach to probability was 
based on “strong evolutionary reasons”. In other words, to assess probability 
Keynes  counted  with  historically  obtained  knowledge,  and  submitted  this 
knowledge to logical intuition: “the field of probability extends beyond common 
sense, and rational intuition has important implications for the scientific method 
which are not so generally accepted…The logical theory of probability therefore 
represented a challenge to the primacy of the scientific method and scientific 
knowledge”. Gillies (2006: 201) reasons along the same lines: “How do we obtain 
knowledge about this logical relation of probability? Keynes’ answer is that we 
get  to  know  at  least  some  probability  relations  by  direct  acquaintance  or 
immediate logical intuition.” 
Keynes  agreed  with  Hume  that  practical  men  should  act  on  probabilistic 
knowledge, but he rejected the philosopher’s skepticism. For Keynes, we don’t know the true causes but we know the probabilities and act accordingly. We 
derive our assessment of probabilities from observation or induction – from the 
generalization  of the  observations made. Thus,  Keynes  pragmatically rejected 
Hume’s famous “problem of induction”, that is, the proposition that we cannot 
deduce  general  laws  from  induction  because  this  would  imply  “ampliative 
inference” – a jump from a number of observations to the truth – which would 
not be justifiable. The classical example of this is the black swan. After observing 
thousands of white swans we are led to say that all swans are white, but there is 
always the possibility that a black swan may appear. This reasoning is logically 
true – ampliative inference is not fully justifiable in rational terms – but it is 
justifiable in reasonable terms. While I see many white swans and don’t see a 
black one, I will believe that it is true that all swans are white, and I will orient 
my actions accordingly. But I should be aware that I might eventually see a black 
swan  that  will  refute  my  belief.  Keynes  (1921:  241)  does  not  derive  high 
probability from simple or pure induction, but when induction is associated with 
“analogy” and reasoning.  As Tiziano Raffaelli (2006: 169) notes, “in the footsteps 
of Bacon and Mill, Keynes maintains that induction is an active process of the 
mind, not a blind enumeration of cases”. To quote Keynes directly (1921: 240):  
In  the  case,  however,  of  most  scientific  arguments,  which  would  commonly  be 
called inductive, the probability that we are right, when we make predictions on the 
basis of past experience, depends not so much on the number of experiences upon 
which we rely, as on the degree in which the circumstances of these experiences 
resemble the known circumstances in which the prediction is take to effect.  
Following  Keynes,  what  I  am  proposing  is  a  pragmatic  response  to  Hume’s 
problem: to continue to make generalizations from our empirical or historical 
observations,  following  statistics  and  econometric  rules,  but  to  be  humble 
enough in relation to our findings, always to recognize that they are provisional 
truths.  This  is  what  I  call  a  “reasonable”  response.  There  are  two  other 
possibilities: one is to become skeptical or relativist; this is pronounce the death 
of science. The other is to condemn induction and to substitute the consistency 
criterion for the empirical one, the logical criterion for the correspondence to 
reality criterion; this is also to reject science, in so far as we understand that the 
substantive sciences (natural as well as social) necessarily have correspondence 
to reality as their truth criterion. As Fausto Vicarelli (1983: 161-162) remarked, Keynes used the “inductive method” in the General Theory to develop his own 
theory and also to explain how entrepreneurs formed expectations and make 
their  investment  decisions.  He  complements  the  use  of  all  the  information 
available on markets, specifically “the intensity of effective demand, the existing 
quantity of capital goods and trends on the stock market”, with reasoned or logic 
knowledge,  and  takes  the  decision.  The  decision  is  taken  under  uncertainty, 
because he does not really know the future, but “the strength of this conception 
thus lies in the way the argument is based on the most objective possible datum, 
namely  observed  reality.  The  subjective  factor  exists:  it  lies  however  in  the 
choice of the aspects of reality taken as a starting point.” 
Regularities 
According  to  a  Platonist  or  rationalist  approach  this  alternative  would  be 
legitimate, not because objective reality does not exist, but because this reality 
would  be  “rational”.  This  was  essentially  Descartes’  philosophical  demarche. 
Physics and astronomy seemed consistent with this view – which I believe to be 
essentially  wrong  –,  because  the  regularities  that  the  researcher  finds  in  the 
physical  world  are  significant.  That  is  why  physicians  complement  so 
successfully empirical research with deductive reasoning. Instead, in the case of 
economics,  economists  must  be  more  parsimonious  in  deductive  reasoning. 
Economics is not an exact science like physics, because humans are not atoms, 
because  the  regularities  that  we  are  able  to  find  in  physics  we  don’t  find  in 
economics by observing free men and women. While in physical reality there are 
regularities that derive from the constant patterns displayed by the atoms that 
constitute it, the regularities that we find in human behavior are limited and 
provisional. While we can predict the behavior of atoms with precision, we may 
assign only modest probabilities to the prediction of human behavior.  
But  the  fact  that  regularities  are  significant  in  physics  does  not  mean  that 
neutrons and electrons act rationally. They just act regularly. In the living world, 
cells act less regularly, and in the social world men and women act still less 
regularly. As a previous winner of an AFEE award, Adolph Lowe (1980: 229), 
noted in his acceptance speech, neoclassical economics adopted two axioms that are at the root of science since the Greeks but that do not apply to the social 
sciences,  namely,  the  “autonomy”  and  the  “inherent  orderliness”  axioms.  The 
first  axiom  “takes  for  granted  the  existence  of  an  outside  world,  moving 
independently  of  man’s  volition”;  the  second,  that  there  is  “an  inherent 
orderliness  in  the  research  object”.  If  these  two  axioms  are  questionable  in 
relation to physics, and still more debatable in relation to biology, they make no 
sense in relation to economics.   
Paul Davidson (1982: 65) founded his post Keynesian critique of neoclassical 
economics on the rejection of this inherent orderliness of economic systems, or, 
in  his  terms,  on  the  rejection  of  the  “ergodic  axiom”.  According  to  him, 
neoclassical  economists  mistake  precision  for  accuracy,  and  “prefer  to  be 
precisely wrong to be roughly right and accurate”.  He explains:  
The axiom of ergodicity permits economists to act “as if” they were dealing with a 
“hard” science where data are homogeneous with respect to time. In the ergodic 
world,  observations  of  a  time  series  realization  (i.e.,  historical  data)  are  useful 
information regarding the probability distribution of the stochastic process, which 
generated that realization.  
In  more  recent  work,  Davidson  distinguishes  the  ergodic  from  the  ordering 
axiom that assumes that  at any point  in  time people  “know”  all the  possible 
future outcomes of any action taken today. The ergodic axiom says practically 
the  same  thing,  just  adding  statistical  reasoning.    In  relation  to  it,  Davidson 
(2007: 32) adds:  
The ergodic axiom therefore assumes that the outcome associated with any future 
data  can  be  reliably  predicted  by  statistical  analysis  of  already  existing  data 
obtained either from time series or cross-sectional data. The future is therefore 
never uncertain. 
Note that this is not a critique of econometric research, which is just a tool to 
allow  us  to  have  a  little  more  confidence  in  our  prediction  of  future  events. 
Econometrics may assume an ergodic world, but its practitioners are supposed 
to know that research outcomes must be taken cum grano salis. This critique is 
directed  toward  “pure”  or  neoclassical  theory,  whose  formal  models  are  not 
based on econometric research, on the observation of reality, but on the axioms 
of  ergodicity,  of  inherent  orderliness,  and  of  homo economicus.  Econometric 
research is not deemed to add confidence to neoclassical models that would be true by definition, because they are demonstrable as are mathematical theorems, 
logically; econometrics exist to test hypotheses.  
Uncertainty and decision making 
Uncertainty is another concept that was central to Keynes’s view of economics – 
economics  as  a  social,  not  a  natural,  science.  As  Robert  Delorme  (2010:  70) 
underlines,  “Keynes’  view  on  uncertainty  in  social  and  human  science,  and 
specially  in  economics,  denotes  a  radical  departure  from  the  perspective  of 
natural science and of  ‘classical’ theory”. It appears as a fundamental concept in 
the General Theory (1936a), but it is fully explained only in the paper that Keynes 
published in the same year in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (1936b). His 
concept  of  uncertainty  holds  that  the  future  is  essentially  uncertain,  and 
represents  the  recognition  that we  are unable  to  predict the  future. We  may 
assign  subjective  probabilities  to  certain  future  events  –  always-weak 
probabilities despite the rigor of our econometrics – but it makes no sense to 
assign probabilities to most future events. It is more reasonable to acknowledge 
that we just don’t know. In his words:  
By “uncertain” knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what 
is known for certain from what is only probable… The sense in which I am using the 
term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of 
copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of new 
inventions, or the position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. 
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. (1936b: 213) 
According to Hyman Minsky (1975: 57), “to understand d Keynes it is necessary 
to understand his sophisticated view about uncertainty, and the importance of 
uncertainty in the economic process. Keynes without uncertainty is something 
like Hamlet without the Prince.” To Minsky, while classical economics and the 
neoclassical  synthesis  were  based  on  a  “barter  paradigm”,  Keynes  included 
money in it and developed a “speculative-financial paradigm”. While uncertainty 
was relatively minor in a barter economy, in a modern speculative economy it is 
central.  
Since at least the 1950s, future business executives have learned in the MBAs of 
the major business schools that the manager is the person who takes decisions under uncertainty. Decisions are not necessary when we know for sure what the 
consequences of our actions are. In this case, we just take the optimum course; 
we turn into neoclassical “optimizers”, and business executives would not be 
necessary. For Keynes, they are very necessary not only because it is difficult to 
assign  probabilities  to  future  events,  but  also  because  in  many  cases 
probabilities become so uncertain that is best just to acknowledge that we just 
don’t know. As Davidson (2007: 32) remarks, “true uncertainty occurs whenever 
an individual cannot specify and/or order a complete set of prospects regarding 
the future”. Or, to derive the consequence of such a definition, true uncertainty is 
the daily experience of businesspersons and more broadly of economic agents. 
Nevertheless,  businesspersons  must  decide.  As  Marx  underlined,  active 
capitalists or entrepreneurs accumulate capital in their search for profits. But, as 
Keynes pointed out, to do that they face uncertainty and, for that reason, they 
have no alternative but to have recourse to a mix of reasoning and intuition, of 
courage and ambition, which he called “animal spirits”. Indeed, uncertainty is 
something that makes rational calculus as limited as it is necessary. It is for this 
reason that economics – the science that studies and tries to predict the behavior 
of economic systems – must be humble or modest. 
It is also for this reason that many economists, frustrated with the imprecision of 
economics,  developed  a  new  and  very  necessary  methodological  science  – 
decision-making theory – and mistook it for economics: a social science. While 
economics has as its object economic systems or market-coordinated systems, 
and  requires  an  empirical  or  historical-deductive  method  to  be  developed, 
decision-making  theory  is  a  methodological  science  like  mathematics  and 
econometrics, a science in which the hypothetical-deductive method is wholly 
acceptable because it has no object, but just the objective of helping us to think 
and  to  make  choices  in  conditions  of  uncertainty.  Marshall’s  microeconomics 
becomes an extraordinary scientific accomplishment when we see it not as the 
microfoundation of economics but as a major attempt to develop decision theory 
– particularly economic decision making or decision-making in the context of 
markets – a theory whose second major contribution is game theory.  The historical-deductive method 
In  economics,  a  proposition  is  true  not  because  we  believe  that  it  describes 
rational behavior, but because it is a generalization of observed and repetitive 
behavior. Besides having definitions and classifications of economic concepts, we 
are able establish causal relations, but we never can claim from one cause or new 
fact that the same consequence always and necessarily follows, as neoclassical 
economics does. Instead, we are allowed to say only that one fact “generally” 
follows  another.  When  we  use  the  hypothetical-deductive  method,  empirical 
studies  serve  only  to  confirm  something  that  we  already  know  to  be  right 
because  it  is  “rational”,  because  it  maximizes  the  interest  of  the  individual 
economic  agent,  while  when  we  adopt  the  historical-deductive  method,  the 
empirical observations associated with loose hypotheses are the subject matter 
from which we infer generalizations. After we have been able to develop a full 
theory,  it  will  retain  its  value  so  long  as  subsequent  observations  continue 
basically  to  confirm  it.  That  is  why  econometric  studies  are  so  valuable.  In 
contrast, when  the  choice  is  the  hypothetical-deductive  method, observations 
that don’t validate the theory are just nuisances, are the consequence of market 
failures that, once eliminated, will show the immanent and necessary truth of the 
theory.  
When we use inductive reasoning we must be modest, because we never know 
that what we are saying is true. We hope that it is true, we believe that it is 
probably true, because our empirical studies point in that direction, but we are 
uncertain, we know that our capacity to predict the future is limited, that the 
behavior of markets does not follow an ergodic path, that in market-coordinated 
societies there is no inner or immanent rationality but an extremely complex 
process whereby men and women express their interests and their values, their 
fears  and  their  hopes,  their  survival  instinct  and  their  convivial  or  solidarity 
instinct.  In  other  words,  we  know  that  social  and  economic  reality  is 
contradictory and requires dialectical reasoning. Our propositions about cause 
and effect are always half true or two-thirds true because correlated factors are 
also present that operate in the opposite direction.  Nevertheless, despite the limitations of the historical method, it is important to 
have the courage to generalize and to build a theory. The classical economists, 
including Marx, knew that, and built a system of knowledge about the capitalist 
economies  of  their  time.  We  cannot  say  the  same  of  the  German  Historical 
School, which in the second part of the 19th century made a major contribution to 
the understanding of the German economy and to the economic policies that 
oriented its late industrialization. Thorsten Veblen, also an institutionalist, was 
critical  of  his  German  counterparts,  although  the  theorizing  of  the  American 
Institutionalist  School  was  hardly  more  developed.3After  that,  Keynes  and 
Kalecki  displayed  boldness in creating macroeconomics, and the structuralist 
economists in creating development macroeconomics. Today, a large g roup of 
economists,  principally in Brazil, are developing a structuralist development 
macroeconomics.4 
When  I  criticize  neoclassic al  economics  for  being  immodest ,  and  the  old 
institutionalists  for being too modest, while   praising  classical and Keynesian 
economics, I  do  not  subscribe to  the  pedestrian  belief  that  “the  truth  in  the 
middle”. For me, neoclassical economics is essentially wrong because it uses the 
wrong method. Neoclassical economists  are sometimes  right  in their analysis 
and in their policymaking, not because they adopt general equilibrium micro and 
rational  expectations  macro  models,  but,  yes,  because  they  use  concepts  and 
propositions that are part of “general economics” – of a basic economics that is 
present  in  good  introductory  texts  –  and  because  they  are  intelligent  and 
experienced economists. The immodest mathematical models that they learned 
in their graduate courses are not a support of but an obstacle to their reasoning. 
In conclusion, a science based on regularities and tendencies is always relatively 
loose because economic agents are not always rational, because they face basic 
uncertainty in  decision-making, because conventions  or institutions condition 
behavior,  and  because  economic  events  are  non-ergodic  –  which  precludes 
                                                        
3 On this critique, see Lowe (1980). 
4 See Bresser-Pereira (2010, 2011). regularity and prevision. The consequence is that economics must be a modest 
science, a reasonable science and a pragmatic science. A modest science because 
its models  are not micro-founded mathematical castles  in the  air, but simple 
relations that must be permanently checked  against reality – a reality whose 
structure  and  institutions  are  permanently  changing;  and  because  its 
generalizations are always provisional and as uncertain as economic behavior. A 
reasonable science because men and women are reasonable beings, not purely 
rational ones.  And a pragmatic science, because growth and financial stability 
are  major  political  objectives  of  modern  democratic  societies,  and  because 
economists are supposed to make sensible diagnoses of economic and financial 
problems and to offer reasonably effective policy recommendations to deal with 
them.  
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